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Abstract
Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical anal-
ysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have
been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over
anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical
attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks
assumes an on-path adversary, who can observe all traffic
traveling between the user’s computer and the secure net-
work.
In this work we investigate these attacks under a different
attack model, in which the adversary is capable of sending
a small amount of malicious JavaScript code to the target
user’s computer. The malicious code mounts a cache side-
channel attack, which exploits the effects of contention on
the CPU’s cache, to identify other websites being browsed.
The effectiveness of this attack scenario has never been sys-
tematically analyzed, especially in the open-world model
which assumes that the user is visiting a mix of both sen-
sitive and non-sensitive sites.
We show that cache website fingerprinting attacks in
JavaScript are highly feasible. Specifically, we use ma-
chine learning techniques to classify traces of cache activ-
ity. Unlike prior works, which try to identify cache con-
flicts, our work measures the overall occupancy of the last-
level cache. We show that our approach achieves high clas-
sification accuracy in both the open-world and the closed-
world models. We further show that our attack is more resis-
tant than network-based fingerprinting to the effects of re-
sponse caching, and that our techniques are resilient both
to network-based defenses and to side-channel countermea-
sures introduced to modern browsers as a response to the
Spectre attack. To protect against cache-based website fin-
gerprinting, new defense mechanisms must be introduced to
privacy-sensitive browsers and websites. We investigate one
such mechanism, and show that generating artificial cache
activity reduces the effectiveness of the attack and com-
pletely eliminates it when used in the Tor Browser.
1 Introduction
Over the last decades the World Wide Web has grown from
an academic exercise to a communication tool that encom-
passes all aspects of modern life. Users use the web to ac-
quire information, manage their finances, conduct their so-
cial life, and more. This shift to the so called virtual life
has resulted in new challenges to users’ privacy. Monitoring
the online behavior of users may reveal personal or sensitive
information about the users, including information such as
sexual orientation or political beliefs and affiliations.
Several tools have been developed to protect the online
privacy of users and hide information about the websites
they visit [18, 20, 71]. Prime amongst these is the Tor
network [20], an overlay network of collaborating servers,
called relays, that anonymously forward Internet traffic be-
tween users and web servers. Tor encrypts the network traffic
of all of the users, and transmits it between relays in a way
that prevents external observers from identifying the traffic
of specific users. In addition to the network itself, the Tor
Project also provides the Tor Browser [82], a modified ver-
sion of the Mozilla Firefox web browser, that further protects
users by disabling features that may allow web sites to track
the users.
Past research has demonstrated that encrypting traffic is
not sufficient for protecting the privacy of the users [10, 29,
35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 53, 60, 66, 67, 73, 88, 89, 93]. Observable
patterns in the metadata of encrypted traffic, specifically, the
size of the transmitted data, its direction, and its timing, may
reveal the web page that the user is visiting. Applying such
website fingerprinting techniques to Tor traffic results in a
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success rate of over 90% in identifying the websites that a
user visits over Tor [73].1
In this paper, we focus on an alternative attack model of
exploiting micro-architectural side-channels, a less explored
option for website fingerprinting. The attack model assumes
a victim that visits a web site under the attacker’s control.
The web site monitors the state of the victim computer’s
cache, and uses that information to infer the victim’s web
activity in other tabs of the same browser, or even in other
browsers.
Because the attack observes the internal state of the target
PC, rather than the network traffic. It offers the potential of
overcoming traffic shaping, often proposed as a defense for
website fingerprinting [11, 12, 15, 63, 90]. Similarly, the
attack may be applicable in scenarios where network-based
fingerprinting is known to be less effective, such as when the
browser caches the contents of the website [36].
We note that the malicious web site does not need to be
fully under the control of the attacker. The attacker only
needs to be able to inject JavaScript code via the web site
to the victim’s browser. This can be done, for example,
through a malicious advertisement or pop-up window. Alter-
natively, documents released by former NSA contractor Ed-
ward Snowden indicate that some nation-state agencies have
the operational capability to exploit this vector on a wide
scale. In March 2013 the German magazine Der Spiegel re-
ported on the existence of a tool called QUANTUMINSERT,
which the GCHQ and the NSA could use to inject malicious
code to any website [78]. The Der Spiegel claims that the
GCHQ successfully used this tool to attack the computers of
employees at the partly-government-held Belgian telecom-
munications company Belgacom, and that the NSA used the
same technology to target high-ranking members of the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at
the organization’s Vienna headquarters. Finally, malicious
advertisements are a viable option for injecting cache side-
channel attacks to browsers [28].
For a small number of websites, under the closed-world
model, Oren et al. [64] show the possibility of fingerprint-
ing via malicious JavaScript code. However, beyond show-
ing the ability to distinguish between a handful of websites,
their work does not provide an analysis of the effective-
ness of the technique. Furthermore, following the disclo-
sure of the Spectre and the Meltdown attacks, which can
also be potentially delivered via malicious JavaScript in-
jection [48, 57], major vendors deployed defenses against
browser-borne side-channel attacks. In particular, all mod-
ern browsers have reduced the resolution of the JavaScript
time function, performance.now(), by several orders of
magnitude [69, 87], making it difficult to tell apart cache hits
1Website fingerprinting is a misnomer. Fingerprinting identifies individ-
ual web pages rather than sites. Following this misnomer, in this work we
use the term website to refer to specific pages, typically the homepage of the
site.
and cache misses. Traditionally, cache attacks require high-
resolution timers, and while mechanisms to generate such
timers in web browsers have been published [31, 49, 76], it
is not clear that these can be used for website fingerprinting.
Thus, in this paper we ask: Are cache-based attacks a vi-
able option for website fingerprinting?
Our Contribution
We answer this question in the affirmative. We design and
implement a cache-based website fingerprinting attack, and
evaluate it in both the closed-world and the open-world mod-
els. We show that in both models our JavaScript-based at-
tacker achieves high fingerprinting accuracy even when ex-
ecuted on modern mainstream browsers that include all re-
cently introduced countermeasures for side-channel (Spec-
tre) attacks. Even when taking these countermeasures to the
extreme, as is done in the Tor Browser, our attack remains
effective, although with a drop in accuracy.
Our attack consists of collecting traces of cache occu-
pancy while the browser downloads and renders web sites.
Adapting the techniques of Rimmer et al. [73], we use deep
neural networks to analyze and to classify the collected
traces. By focusing on cache occupancy rather than on activ-
ity within specific cache sets, our attack avoids the need for
high resolution timers required by prior cache-based attacks.
Furthermore, because our technique does not depend on the
layout of the cache, it can overcome proposed countermea-
sures that randomize the cache layout [58, 70, 91].
We investigate the source of the information in the cache
occupancy traces and show that they contain information
from both the networking activity and the rendering activity
of the browser. Using information from the rendering ac-
tivity allows our attack to remain effective even in scenarios
that thwart network-based fingerprinting, such as when the
browser retrieves data from its response cache and not from
the network, or when the network traffic is shaped.
Finally, we investigate a potential countermeasure that in-
troduces a high level of activity into the last level cache. We
show that the countermeasure reduces the success rate of the
attack. In particular, the noise completely masks the activ-
ity of the Tor Browser, reducing the attack accuracy to that
of a random guess. This countermeasure results in a mean
slowdown of 5% for CPU benchmarks, which we consider
reasonable when visiting privacy-sensitive web sites.
More specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We design and implement the cache occupancy side-
channel attack, a cache-based side channel attack tech-
nique which can operate with the low timer resolution
supported in modern JavaScript engines. Our attacks
only require a sampling rate six orders of magnitude
lower than required for the prior attacks of Oren et
al. [64] (Section 4).
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• We evaluate the use of two machine learning tech-
niques, CNN and LSTM, for fingerprinting websites
based on the cache activity traces collected while loaded
by the browsers (Section 5).
• We show that cache-based fingerprinting has high ac-
curacy in both the closed- and the open-world models,
under a variety of operating systems and browsers (Sec-
tion 6).
• We evaluate both fingerprinting methods without delet-
ing the browser response cache, and show that while the
accuracy of network-based fingerprinting drops signifi-
cantly, the accuracy of cache-based fingerprinting is not
affected (Section 7.3).
• We show that cache-based fingerprints contain informa-
tion both from the network activity and from the ren-
dering activity of the target device. Therefore, cache-
based fingerprinting maintains a high accuracy even in
the presence of traffic molding countermeasures which
force a constant bit rate on network traffic (Section 7.4).
• We design and evaluate a countermeasure that intro-
duces noise in the cache. The countermeasure is appli-
cable from both native code and from JavaScript, com-
pletely blocks the attack on the Tor Browser, and only
causes a small performance degradation on CPU-bound
workloads (Section 9).
2 Background
2.1 Tor
Tor [20], is a collection of collaborating servers called relays,
designed to provide privacy for network communication. Tor
aims to protect users from on-path adversaries that can ob-
serve the network traffic. In this scenario, a user uses a PC
to browse the web, and an adversary positioned between the
user’s PC and the destination web server captures the infor-
mation that the user exchanges with the web server.
A common protection for such an attack model is to use
encryption, e.g., using protocols such as TLS [19] which un-
derlies the security of the HTTPS scheme [72]. However,
this solution only protects the contents of the communica-
tion, leaving the identity of the communicating parties ex-
posed to the adversary. Knowing that users merely con-
nected to a certain sensitive website may be enough to in-
criminate them, even if the actual data exchanged over the
secure connection is not known. This risk became a real-
ity in 2016, as tens of thousands of individuals were perse-
cuted by the Turkish government for accessing the domain
bylock.net [50].
The main aim of Tor is thus to protect the identity of the
communicating parties. Tor achieves this protection by for-
warding the users’ communication through a circuit consist-
ing of a few (typically three) Tor relays. The user encrypts
the network traffic with multiple layers of encryption, and
each relay in the circuit decrypts a successive layer to find
out where to forward the traffic. See Dingledine et al. [20]
for further information.
2.2 Website Fingerprinting Attacks and De-
fences
In the conventional attack model of a network-level attacker,
much previous work has demonstrated the ability of an ad-
versary to make probabilistic inferences about users’ com-
munications via statistical analysis, even if these communi-
cations are in their encrypted form. These works have inves-
tigated both the selection of features (such as packet sizes,
packet timings, direction of communication), as well as the
design of classifiers (such as support vector machines, ran-
dom forests, Naive Bayes) to make accurate predictions [10,
29, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 53, 60, 66, 67, 73, 88, 89, 93]. In re-
sponse, several defense mechanisms have been proposed in
the literature [11, 12, 15, 63, 90]. The common idea behind
these defenses is to inject random delays and spurious cover
traffic to perturb the traffic features and therefore obfuscate
users’ communications. A common point of all of these
defenses is a typical trade-off between latency/bandwidth
and privacy, and thus they face deployment hurdles. Rim-
mer et al. [73] have recently proposed a family of classi-
fiers based on deep learning algorithms such as SDAE, CNN
and LSTM, which operate on the raw network traces and are
therefore less sensitive to ad-hoc defenses against particular
traffic features.
2.3 Cache Side-Channel Attacks
When programs execute on a processor, they share the
use of micro-architectural components such as the cache.
This sharing may result in unintended communication chan-
nels, often called side channels, between programs [27, 39],
which may be used to leak secret information. In partic-
ular, cache-based attacks, which exploit contention on one
of the processor’s caches, can leak secrets such as crypto-
graphic keys [4, 26, 65, 68, 83], keystrokes [32], address
layout [23, 31, 33], etc.
Cache Operation. Caches bridge the speed gap between
the faster processor and the slower memory. The cache is a
small bank of memory, which stores the contents of recently
accessed memory locations. Most caches in modern proces-
sors are set associative. The cache is divided into partitions
called sets. Each memory location maps to a single set and
can only be cached in the set it maps to. When the processor
needs to access a specific memory location, it successively
searches in a hierarchy of caches. In a cache hit, when the
contents of the required address is found in the cache, access
is performed on the cached contents. Otherwise, in a cache
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miss, the process repeats on the next cache level. A miss on
the last-level cache (LLC) results in a time-consuming access
to the RAM.
The Prime+Probe Technique. Past cache-based attacks
from web browsers [28, 64] employ the Prime+Probe tech-
nique [65, 68], which exploits the set-associative structure.
Each round of attack consists of three steps. In the first step,
the cache is primed, i.e., the attacker completely fills some
of the cache sets with its own data. The attacker then waits
some time to allow the victim to execute. Finally, the attacker
probes the cache by measuring the time it takes to access the
previously-cached data in each of the sets. If the victim ac-
cesses memory locations that map to a monitored cache set,
the victim’s memory contents will replace the attacker con-
tents in the cache. Hence, the attacker will need to retrieve
the data from lower levels in the hierarchy, increasing the ac-
cess time to its data. Prime+Probe has been used for attacks
on data [65, 68] and instruction [3, 4] caches, as well as for
attacks on the LLC [43, 59]. It has been shown practical in
multiple settings, including across different virtual machines
in cloud environments [40] and from mobile code [28, 64].
Countermeasures in JavaScript. The time difference be-
tween the latencies of a memory access and cache access is
on the order of 0.1 µs. To distinguish between cache hits
and misses, cache attacks typically require a high resolution
timer. Following the publication of the first demonstration of
a cache attack in JavaScript [64], some browsers started re-
ducing the resolution of the timers they provide as a counter-
measure for cache side channel attacks. This approach had
become wide-spread after the disclosure of the Spectre at-
tack [48], and now all mainstream browsers incorporate this
countermeasure. Furthermore, while non-traditional timers
in browsers have been identified [25, 49, 76], browsers and
extensions have since disabled many of the features that al-
low sub-microsecond resolution [61, 69, 77]. An extreme
case of this behavior can be found in the Tor Browser, which
restricts the timer resolution to 100 ms, or 10 Hz.
Several of the previously discovered timers rely on
browser features that are accessible from JavaScript. These
are not accessible in environments such as Cloudflare Work-
ers [7], which rely on the absence of high-resolution timers
to protect against timing attacks [85].
2.4 Related Work
Several past works have looked at the possibility of perform-
ing website fingerprinting based on local side-channel infor-
mation. In all of these works, which we survey in Table 1,
the adversary observes some property of the system while
the victim browser is rendering a webpage. The adversary
then applies a machine learning classifier to the observed
side-channel trace to identify the rendered website.2 Some
2 A different but closely related class of attacks are “history sniffing” at-
tacks, such as [54, 92], in which the attacker wishes to learn which websites
of these works assume that the adversary has malicious con-
trol over a hardware component or peripheral [16, 56, 94].
Others assume that the adversary can execute arbitrary na-
tive code on the target hardware [34, 44, 51, 80]. Yet others
make the much more modest assumption that the adversary
can induce the victim to render a webpage containing mali-
cious JavaScript code [8, 47, 64, 86]. We mainly investigate
the last model.
Kim et al. [47] abuse a data leak in the Chrome imple-
mentation of the Quota Management API, which has been
since fixed. Our attack, in contrast, is based on a funda-
mental property of the CPU running the browser application,
which is far less trivial to fix. (See Section 9.) Moreover, the
mitigations put in place as part of the response to the Spec-
tre and Meltdown disclosures make the high sampling rates
exploited thus far [64, 86] unattainable in modern secure
browsers. Our attack, in contrast, achieves high accuracy at
drastically lower sampling rates and is capable of classifying
a significant number of websites at sampling rates as low as
10 Hz. To the best of our knowledge, no cache attack that
uses such low clock resolutions has been demonstrated.
In addition, Oren et al. [64] only recorded a small num-
ber of traces from a few popular websites, and did not in-
vestigate the effectiveness of cache-based fingerprinting in
open-world contexts, or in scenarios where various anti-
fingerprinting measures are in place. We address all of
these shortcomings in this work. Furthermore, while Oren et
al. [64] do target the Tor Browser, the attack code executes
in a different mainstream browser. Unlike our work, they
do not demonstrate an attack from JavaScript code running
within the Tor Browser.
Booth [8] is able to classify a moderate amount of web-
sites using a non-cache-based method with a millisecond
clock. Their attack, however, saturates all of the victim’s
CPU cores with math-intensive worker threads, making it
highly noticeable and easy to detect by the victim.
Cock et al. [17] implement a covert channel using an
L1 cache occupancy channel. Ristenpart et al. [74] show
that a cache occupancy channel can detect keystroke timing
and network load in co-located virtual machines on cloud
servers. Both use the technique with high resolution (sub
nanosecond) timers. We are not aware of any prior use of the
cache occupancy channel to overcome low resolution timers.
3 The Website Fingerprinting Attack Model
The classical attack model used to evaluate website finger-
printing attacks is presented in Figure 1. In this model, a
targeted user uses a web browser to display a sensitive web-
site. To protect their privacy, the user does not connect to
the website directly, but instead uses a secure network, such
as the Tor network, for the connection. The attacker is typ-
the victim has visited in the past.
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Table 1: Related work on website fingerprinting based on local side channels.
Sampling
Work Target Side Channel Attack Model rate [Hz]
Clark et al., 2013 [16] Chrome (Mac, Win, Linux) Power consumption Hardware 250000
Yang et al., 2017 [94] Multiple smartphones Power consumption Hardware 200000
Lifshits et al., 2018 [56] Android Browser, Chrome Android Power consumption Hardware 1000
Jana and Shmatikov, 2012 [44] Chrome Linux, Firefox Linux, Android
Browser (VM)
App memory footprint Native code 100000
Lee et al., 2014 [51] Chromium Linux, Firefox Linux GPU memory leaks Native code N/A
Spreitzer et al., 2016 [80] Chrome Android, Android Browser, Tor
Android
Data-Usage Statistics Native code 20–50
Gu¨lmezoglu et al., 2017 [34] Chrome Linux (Intel and ARM), Tor
Linux
Performance counters Native code 10000
Oren et al, 2015 [64] Safari MacOS, Tor MacOS Last-level cache JavaScript 108
Booth, 2015 [8] Chrome (Mac, Win, Linux), Firefox
Linux
CPU activity JavaScript 1000
Kim et al., 2016 [47] Chromium Linux, Chrome (Win, An-
droid)
Quota Management API JavaScript N/A
Vila and Ko¨pf, 2017 [86] Chromium Linux, Chrome Mac Shared event loop JavaScript 40000
This work Chrome (Win, Linux), Firefox (Win,
Linux), Safari MacOS, Tor Linux
Last-level cache JavaScript 10–500
Target PC
Target AdversaryTarget Browser
Sensitive 
Website
Secure Network
Figure 1: The classical website fingerprinting attack model.
The (passive) adversary monitors the traffic between the tar-
get user and the secure network.
ically modeled as an on-path adversary, who is capable of
observing all traffic entering and leaving the Tor network in
the direction of the target user. The adversary cannot un-
derstand the contents of the network traffic since it is en-
crypted when it enters the Tor network. The adversary is
furthermore unable to directly determine the ultimate desti-
nation of the communications after it exits the Tor network,
thanks to Tor’s routing protocol. Finally, due to the encryp-
tion and the validation of the Tor network, the attacker is
unable to modify the traffic without terminating the con-
nection. An important thread of research on the security
of Tor has investigated the ability of such an adversary to
perform statistical traffic analysis of encrypted traffic, and
then to make probabilistic inferences about users’ communi-
cations [10, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 53, 60, 66, 67, 73, 88, 89, 93].
Gong et al. [29] suggest a variation on this scheme, in which
the attacker remotely probes routers to estimate the load of
the network traffic they process and performs the statistical
analysis based on this estimated traffic. Jansen et al. [45]
suggest another variation in which the attacker monitors the
traffic inside the Tor network, rather then monitoring traffic
at the network’s edge.
Target PC
Target
Architectural 
Boundary
Sensitive Session
Sensitive 
Website
Standard Session
Standard 
Website
Adversary
Secure Network
Figure 2: Remote cache-based website fingerprinting attack
model. The remote attacker injects malicious JavaScript
code into a browser running on the target machine.
In this work we discuss a different attack model, presented
in Figure 2. In this model, the target user has two concur-
rent browsing sessions. In one session, the user browses to
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an adversary-controlled site, which contains some malicious
JavaScript code. In the other session, the user browses to
some sensitive web site. Due to architectural boundaries,
such as sandboxing or process isolation, the malicious code
cannot directly observe the internal state of the sensitive ses-
sion. Hence, the adversary cannot directly determine the
ultimate destination of any communication issued from the
sensitive session, even when the sensitive session is using a
direct unencrypted connection to the remote server. The ma-
licious code can, however, observe the micro-architectural
state of the processor, and use this information to spy on the
sensitive session.
Our attack can therefore be considered in the following
scenarios:
• A cross-tab scenario, where a user is made to visit
an attacker-controlled website containing malicious
JavaScript, and this website tries to learn what other
sensitive sites the user is visiting at the same time.
These attacker-controlled and sensitive browsing ses-
sions can be carried out on the same browser, on two
different browsers belonging to the same user, or even
on two browsers residing in two completely isolated vir-
tual machines which share the same underlying hard-
ware [75].
One possible way of causing the user to browse to such
an attacker-controlled site is through a phishing attack,
where the attacker sends fraudulent messages, purport-
ing to be from a benign source, that induces the victim
to click on a link to a malicious web site. Alternatively,
the attacker may pay an advertisement service to dis-
play a (malicious) advertisement when the user visits a
third-party website [28].
• A cross-network scenario, where the attacker is an ac-
tive on-path adversary capable of injecting JavaScript
into any non-encrypted page. The attacker would like to
leverage that access to try to learn about the user’s sen-
sitive activity, even though the attacker cannot manipu-
late or access this traffic directly. For example, the user
may simultaneously run one browsing session over an
unsecured connection for mundane tasks, and another
browsing session over a second, secured connection for
sensitive tasks. An attacker capable of modifying traffic
on the standard link can learn about activity carried out
over the secured link, whether this secure connection
made through a VPN, through the Tor network, or even
through a separate network adapter which the attacker
cannot see.
The main challenge of the our attack model is the ex-
tremely restricted JavaScript runtime, which requires the at-
tacker code to be written in a particular way, as we describe
further in Section 4.
Regardless of the delivery vector, cache-based fingerprint-
ing has a strong potential advantage over network-based fin-
gerprinting, since it can indirectly observe both the com-
puter’s network activity and the browser’s rendering process.
As we demonstrate in Section 7.4, both of these elements
contribute to the accuracy of our classifier.
4 Data Collection
4.1 Creating memorygrams
The raw data trace for network-based attacks takes the form
of a network trace, commonly in the pcap file format, which
contains a timestamped sequence of all traffic observed on a
certain network link. The corresponding data trace in the
case of cache attacks is the memorygram [64]—a trace of
the cache access latency measured at a constant sampling
rate over a given time period. The memorygrams of Oren
et al. [64] describe the latency of multiple individual sets
or groups of sets at each point in time, resulting in a two-
dimensional array. In contrast, in this work we use a simpli-
fied, one-dimensional memorygram form. The contents of
each entry in our memorygrams is a proxy for the occupancy
of the cache at the specific time period. We collect memo-
rygrams while the browser loads and displays websites, and
use the data as fingerprints for website classification.
The Cache Occupancy Channel. Unlike prior works [28,
64], which use the Prime+Probe side-channel attack from
JavaScript, we use a cache occupancy channel. The main dif-
ference is that the Prime+Probe attack measures contentions
in specific cache sets, whereas our attack measures con-
tention over the whole cache. Specifically, our JavaScript
attack allocates an LLC-sized buffer and measures the time
to access the entire buffer. The victim’s access to memory
evicts the contents of our buffer from the cache, introducing
delays for our access. Thus, the time to access our buffer
is roughly proportional to the number of cache lines that the
victim uses. Cache occupancy has previously been imple-
mented in native code and used for covert channels and for
measuring co-resident activity [17, 74]. Both of these imple-
mentations rely on high resolution timers. To our knowledge,
we are the first to use the cache occupancy channel with a
low resolution timer.
Overcoming Hardware Prefetchers. Ideally, we would
like to collect information across the whole cache. Intel
processors, however, try to optimize memory accesses by
prefetching memory locations that the processor predicts
will be accessed in the future. Because prefetching changes
the cache state, we need to fool the prefetchers. To fool the
spatial prefetcher [42], we use the technique of Yarom and
Benger [96] and do not probe adjacent cache sets. To fool
the streaming prefetcher, which tries to identify sequences
of cache accesses, we use a common approach of masking
access patterns by randomizing the order of the memory ac-
cesses we perform [59, 65].
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Spatial Information. Compared with the Prime+Probe
attack, the cache occupancy channel does not provide any
spatial information. That is, the adversary does not learn
any information on the addresses that the victim accesses.
While this is a clear disadvantage of the cache occupancy
channel, our attack does not require spatial information. The
main reason is that modern browsers have complex memory
allocation patterns. Consequently, the location that data is
allocated changes each time a page is downloaded, and the
location carries little information on the downloaded page.
In practice, not having spatial information is also an advan-
tage. Without it, there is no need to build eviction sets for
cache sets, a process that can take significant time [28].
Website Memorygrams. We capture memorygrams when
the browser navigates to websites and displays them. We
use a JavaScript-based memorygrammer to probe the cache
at a fixed rate of one sample every 2 ms. We continue the
probe for 30 seconds, resulting in a vector of length 15,000.
When a probe takes longer than 2 ms, we miss the slot of the
next probe. We use a special value to indicate this case. We
use this collection method for all mainstream browsers other
than the Tor Browser,
When the attack code is launched from within the Tor
Browser, where the timer resolution is limited to 100 ms, we
do not measure how long a sweep over the cache takes, but
instead count how many sweeps over the entire cache fit into
a single 100 ms timeslot. In addition, we do not probe for 30
seconds in this setting, but rather for 50 seconds, to account
for the slower response time over the Tor network. Hence,
Tor memorygrams contain 500 measurements over the entire
50 second measurement time period.
The native code memorygrammer used for the evaluations
in Section 7 does not suffer from a reduced timing resolution
when measuring the Tor Browser. Therefore, on mainstream
browsers it runs for 30 seconds and produces 15,000 entries,
and on the Tor Browser it runs for 50 seconds and produces
25,000 entries.
Sanity Check. Before proceeding, we want to verify
that memorygrams can be used for fingerprinting. Indeed,
Figure 3 shows graphical representations of memorygrams
of three sites: Wikipedia (https://www.wikipedia.
com), Github (https://www.github.com), and Ora-
cle (https://www.oracle.com), collected through the
native code memorygrammer. Each memorygram is dis-
played as a colored strip, where time goes from left to right
and the shade corresponds to cache activity at each time.
(Lighter shades correspond to fewer evictions.) We see that
the three memorygrams of each site, while not identical, are
similar to each other. The memorygrams of different web-
sites are, however, very different from each other. This in-
dicates that memorygrams may be used for identifying web-
sites.
Wikipedia
Github
Oracle
Figure 3: Examples of memorygrams. Time progresses from
left to right, shade indicates the number of evictions. (Darker
shades correspond to more eviction.)
4.2 Datasets
Closed World Datasets. We evaluate our cache-based
fingerprinting on six different combinations of browsers and
operating systems, summarized in Table 2. Many early
works on website fingerprinting operated under a closed
world assumption, where the attacker’s aim is to distinguish
among accesses to a relatively small list of websites. Our
closed world datasets follow this line of work. These datasets
consist of 100 traces each for a set of 100 websites, to a total
of 10,000 memorygrams. We use the same list of 100 web-
sites that Rimmer et al. [73] selected from the top Alexa sites.
(See Appendix B for a complete list of websites included.)
Similar to previous works, no traffic molding is applied and
only one tab is opened at a time. The browser’s response
cache, however, is not cleared before accessing each web-
site, an aspect of the experiment we analyze in more detail
in Section 7.
Open World Datasets. One common criticism of the closed
world assumption is that it requires the attacker to know the
complete set of websites the victim is planning to visit, al-
lowing the attacker to prepare and train classifiers for each
of these websites. This assumption was challenged by many
authors, for example Jua´rez et al. [46]. To address this crit-
icism, website fingerprinting methods are often evaluated in
an open-world setting. In this setting, the attacker wishes to
monitor access to a set of sensitive websites, and is expected
to classify them with high accuracy. Additionally, there is a
large set of non-sensitive web pages, all of which the attacker
is expected to generally label as “non-sensitive”.
To evaluate our fingerprinting method in the open-world
settings, we augment the closed-world datasets with addi-
tional 5,000 traces, each collected for a single unique web-
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site, again using the list of websites provided by Rimmer et
al. [73]. The base rate for this setting is 33.3%, since a trivial
classifier can simply decide that all pages are non-sensitive.
5 Machine Learning
5.1 Problem Formulation
Website fingerprinting is generally formulated as a super-
vised learning problem, consisting of a template building
step and an attack step. In the template building step, the
adversary visits each target website multiple times and col-
lects a set of labeled traces (either network traces or memo-
rygrams), each corresponding to a visit to a certain website.
Next, the adversary trains a classifier algorithm on these la-
beled traces, using either classical machine learning methods
or deep learning methods.
In the attack step, the adversary is presented with a set of
unlabeled traces, each one corresponding to a visit to an un-
known website. The adversary then applies the previously
trained classifier to each of these traces and outputs a guess
for each trace. The accuracy of the classifier is finally calcu-
lated as the percentage of the correctly assigned labels.
5.2 Deep Learning Models
Early works on website fingerprinting, starting from Cheng
and Avnur [14], used classical machine learning methods
such as Naive Bayes, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and
k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN). As a prerequisite step to run-
ning these classical machine learning methods, the adversary
needs to apply an additional feature extraction step which
transforms the raw trace into a more succinct representation.
Since these features were chosen through human insight into
the nature of network traffic, there was no immediate way of
directly applying them to memorygram analysis.
Abe and Goto [2] and later Rimmer et al. [73] suggest
using deep learning for website fingerprinting. Deep learn-
ing performs automatic feature learning from the raw data,
reducing the reliance on human insight at the cost of a
larger required training set. Rimmer et al. [73] show that,
given a large enough training set, deep-learning website-
fingerprinting approaches are as effective as earlier meth-
ods which require manual feature selection. An advantage of
this approach is that it allows us to compare network-based
and cache-based fingerprinting based on the merit of the raw
data, rather than on the specific choice of features.
Deep Neural Network Configuration. A deep neural net-
work (DNN) is typically configured as a sequence of non-
linear layers which transform the raw data, first extracting
salient features and then selecting the appropriate ones [30].
Every layer in a DNN consists of a set of artificial neurons,
each connected to a set of outputs from the previous lay-
ers. At the forward propagation stage, the activation func-
tion is applied to the product of the each neuron’s input and
its weight value, and then forwarded to the next layer.
For the last layer in the DNNs we evaluate we use a soft-
max layer, which outputs a vector containing a-posteriori
probabilities for each one of the classes.
The process of training the neural network uses back-
propagation to update the weights of each neuron to achieve
a minimum loss at the output. First, the model calculates the
cost between the true classification of the measurement and
the predicted value using a loss function. Next, the model
updates the weights of the each neuron based on the calcu-
lated loss. Every round of forward propagation and back-
propagation is called an epoch. A neural network model runs
multiple epochs to learn the weights for accurate classifica-
tion.
We evaluate deep learning using two classifier models,
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) networks [38]. A CNN uses a se-
quence of feature mapping layers alternating between con-
volutions and max-pooling. Each of the layers sub-samples
the previous layer, iteratively reducing the size of the input
to a more succinct representation, while preserving the in-
formation they encode. Each convolutional layer is a neural
network specialised for detecting complex patterns in its in-
put. The convolution layer applies several filters to the input
vector, each of which is designed to identify an abstract pat-
tern in a sequence of input elements it is provided with. The
max-pooling layers reduce the dimensionality of the data by
subsampling the filters, choosing the maximum value from
adjacent groups of neurons applied by the filters. This alter-
nating sequence of layers extracts complicated features from
the input and produces vectors short enough for the classi-
fiers. The feature mapping layers are followed by a dense
layer, in which every neuron is connected to every output of
the feature extraction phase. The LSTM-based network has
an initial feature selection step similar to the CNN, but then
adds an additional layer in which each neuron has a memory
cell, with the output of this neuron determined both by its
inputs and by the value of this memory cell. This allows the
classifier to identify patterns in time-based data.
Hyperparameter Selection. Hyperparameters describe the
overall structure of the DNN and of each layer. The choice of
hyperparameters depends on the specific classification prob-
lem. For network-based fingerprinting, we replicated the
parameters specified in the dataset provided by Rimmer et
al. [73]. For cache-based fingerprinting, we manually evalu-
ated several choices for each hyperparameter.
To prevent overfitting, we use 10-fold cross validation. We
split each dataset consisting of traces into 10 folds of equal
size, and select one fold, consisting of 10% of the traces, as a
test set. The remaining 90% of the traces are used for train-
ing the classifier, with 81% serving as the training set and
9% as the validation set. The model trains on the training
set and the evaluation is done on the test set. The number of
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epochs is regulated with an Early-Stop function which stops
the epochs when the accuracy of the validation set no longer
increases over successive iterations. The selected hyperpa-
rameters are summarized in Appendix A.
For the CNN classifier we use three pairs of convolution
and max pooling layers. For the LSTM classifier we use two.
As discussed above, the traces captured by the code running
within the Tor Browser contain only 500 measurements, due
to the reduced timer resolution. For these shorter traces, we
modified the architecture of our LSTM-based classifier. The
feature selection of this classifier contains only one convo-
lution layer. We therefore used a pool-size of three for the
max-pooling layer to limit the feature reduction before the
LSTM layer. In addition, because of the small amount of
features, we could increase the number of LSTM units to
128 and learn more complex patterns from the features.
6 Results
All of the results in this section were obtained by using keras
version 2.1.4, with TensorFlow version 1.7 as the back end,
running on two Ubuntu Linux 16.04 servers, one with two
Xeon E5-2660 v4 processors and 128 GB of RAM, and one
with two Xeon E5-2620 v3 processors and 128 GB of RAM.
Our machine learning instances took approximately 40 min-
utes to run in this configuration.
Table 2 presents the fingerprinting accuracy we obtain.
Recall that in this scenario the JavaScript interpreter of the
targeted browser executes the memorygrammer. Consider-
ing that all modern browsers reduced their timer resolution
and some added jitter as a countermeasure for the Spectre at-
tack [69, 87], the first question we need to address is whether
it is even possible to implement cache-based fingerprinting
attacks in such an environment.
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Figure 4: Cache probe latencies compared to modern
browser timing resolutions.
To answer this question, we measured the latencies of the
cache occupancy channel using a high-resolution timer while
the browser was downloading a web page. Figure 4 shows
the distribution of these latencies. The figure also uses ver-
tical lines to indicate the timer resolutions of the various
browsers. (See Table 2.) As we can see, even at the 2 ms
resolution of the Firefox 59 timer, it is possible to distinguish
between 80% of the probes which take less than 2 ms and the
remaining 20%. This is a welcome side-effect of the use of a
large buffer which is accessed at every probing step. None of
the cache probes we measured, however, took longer than the
100 ms clock period of the Tor Browser. Hence, when run-
ning within the Tor Browser, we count the number of probes
we can perform within each clock tick. (See Section 4.)
The next question is whether the information we collect
with this low resolution is sufficient for fingerprinting. In-
deed, Table 2 shows that in all of the environments we test
our classifier is significantly better than a random guess. Re-
markably, as our results show, even the highly restricted Tor
Browser can be used for mounting cache attacks, albeit with
a significantly lower accuracy than that of general-purpose
browsers.
6.1 Closed World Results
We first look at the typical closed-world scenario investi-
gated by past works. In mainstream browsers, our JavaScript
attack code is consistently able to provide classification ac-
curacies of 70–90%, well over the base rate of 1%. The Tor
Browser attack, however, achieves a lower accuracy of 47%.
If we, however, look not only at the top result output by the
classifier, but also check whether the correct website is one of
the top 5 detected websites, the accuracy of the Tor Browser
attack climbs to 72%, with a base rate of 5%. This method of
looking at the few most probable outputs of a classifier was
previously used in similar classification problems [13, 62].
With some a-priori information an attacker can deduce which
of the top 5 pages the victim has accessed.
We can compare the accuracy of our cache-based fin-
gerprinting to the one obtained by state-of-the-art network-
based methods, as reported by Rimmer et al. [73]. We see
that while there are differences between the classification ac-
curacy achieved in each case, the overall accuracy is com-
parable, assuming both attacks capture the same amount of
traces per website. As in the network-based setting, we be-
lieve that capturing more than 100 traces per website is likely
to increase the accuracy and the stability of our classifier.
6.2 Open World Results
We next turn to the more challenging open-world scenario,
in which the 100 sensitive webpages must be distinguished
from an additional set of 5,000 non-sensitive pages. As seen
in Table 2 the JavaScript-based website fingerprinting code
performs well under this scenario as well, again achieving
classification accuracy of 70–90%. We note that in most
cases the results are slightly better than the closed-world re-
sults. The reason is the larger size of the “non-sensitive”
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Table 2: Accuracy obtained by in-browser memorygrammer— Mean (percents) and standard deviation.
Operating LLC Timer Closed World Open World
System CPU Size Browser Resolution CNN LSTM CNN LSTM
Linux i5-2500 6 MB Firefox 59 2.0 ms 78.5±1.7 80.0±0.6 86.8±0.9 87.4±1.2
Linux i5-2500 6 MB Chrome 64 0.1 ms 84.9±0.7 91.4±1.2 84.3±0.7 86.4±0.3
Windows i5-3470 6 MB Firefox 59 2.0 ms 86.8±0.7 87.7±0.8 84.3±0.6 87.7±0.3
Windows i5-3470 6 MB Chrome 64 0.1 ms 78.2±1.0 80.0±1.6 86.1±0.8 80.6±0.2
Mac OS i7-6700 8 MB Safari 11.1 1.0 ms 72.5±0.7 72.6±1.3 80.5±1.0 72.9±0.9
Linux i5-2500 6 MB Tor Browser 7.5 100.0 ms 45.4±2.7 46.7±4.1 60.5±2.2 62.9±3.3
Linux i5-2500 6 MB Tor Browser 7.5 (top 5) 100.0 ms 71.9±2.1 70.0±1.7 80.4±1.7 82.7±1.8
class. As discussed earlier, this also significantly increases
the base rate for open-world scenarios to 33.3%.
As in the case of the closed-world setting, we can evaluate
the accuracy of the Tor Browser under a top-5 assumption,
i.e. when checking for the correct website in the top five out-
puts of the classifier. Under this relaxation the Tor Browser
attack achieves a high accuracy rate of 83%, with a base rate
of 37.3%.
The classification to sensitive vs. non-sensitive site is a
binary classification problem, We can, therefore, apply stan-
dard analysis techniques to this aspect of the results. We
achieved a near perfect classification in all of the open world
settings we evaluated, achieving an area under curve (AUC)
of more than 99% in all cases.
7 Robustness Tests
Having demonstrated the effectiveness of our website finger-
printing technique, we now turn our attention to its robust-
ness and test its resilience to issues known to affect network-
based fingerprinting.
7.1 Evaluation Setup
Collection Host
Memorygrammer
Target Browser Network TracerTest Harness
Network
Figure 5: Data Collection Setup for the Robustness Tests.
To compare the results of network fingerprinting with
cache-based fingerprinting, we need to modify our data col-
lection setup. The setup, illustrated in Figure 5, consists
of two data collection hosts. The memorygram collection
host, which simulates the victim’s machine, runs both the
target browser and the memorygrammer software. The net-
work tracer sits on-path between the memorygram collection
hosts and the Internet, and collects a record of the network
traffic. A test harness written in Perl and Python invokes the
memorygrammer, the network tracer and the target browser
at the same time, then saves a correlated data record consist-
ing of the memorygram, the network trace in pcap format,
and a screenshot of the target web page for monitoring pur-
poses. For data collection, we use HP Elite 8300 desktop
computers featuring Intel Core i5-2500 CPUs at 3.30 GHz,
with a 6 MB last-level cache, running CentOS 7.2.1511 and
either Firefox 59 or Tor Browser 7.5.
For the robustness tests we use a native-code memory-
grammer, which is based on the Prime+Probe implemen-
tation of Mastik, a side-channel toolkit released under the
GNU Public License [95]. We apply two modifications to
the Mastik code. First, we change the Prime+Probe code
to measure cache occupancy rather than activity in specific
cache sets. Secondly, we use the processor’s performance
counters [41] to count the number of cache evictions rather
than use the high resolution timer to identify evictions. The
use of performance counters for attack purposes has already
been proposed and investigated in the past [6, 9, 52, 84].
7.2 Baseline Scenario
Our baseline scenario replicates the results of our closed
world JavaScript memorygrammer, as well as some of the
results of Rimmer et al. [73]. As we can see in Table 3, the
native-code memorygrammer gives a slightly better accuracy
than the JavaScript memorygrammer on Firefox. When at-
tacking the Tor Browser, the native code memorygrammer
achieves much better results than the in-browser JavaScript
code. We believe that the cause of the improvement is the
higher probing accuracy afforded by the native-code mem-
orygrammer. In both browsers, the results of the native-
code memorygrammer are similar to those achievable with
network-based fingerprinting.
10
Table 3: Accuracy obtained in robustness tests — Mean (percents) and Standard deviation.
Firefox Network Firefox Cache Tor Network Tor Cache
Test CNN LSTM CNN LSTM CNN LSTM CNN LSTM
Baseline 86.4±1.0 93.2±0.5 94.9±0.5 94.8±0.5 77.6±1.6 90.9±0.7 72.7±0.7 80.4±0.5
Response cache enabled 56.1±1.5 70.6±1.5 92.2±0.8 92.2±0.5 55.5±1.7 65.9±1.0 86.1±0.5 86.3±0.6
Render only – – – – 1.0±0.0 1.0±0.0 63.3±1.1 63.9±1.5
Network only – – – – 77.6±1.6 90.9±0.7 19.9±1.8 51.9±2.7
Temporal drift – – – – 64.5±2.2 81.0±0.6 68.3±0.5 75.6±0.7
7.3 Enabling the Response Cache
Network-based fingerprinting methods, by definition, must
rely on network traffic to perform classification. Typically,
due to caching, many web pages are loaded with partial or
no network traffic. As specified in RFC 7234 [24], the per-
formance of web browsers is typically improved by the use
of response caches. When a web browser client requests a
remote resource from a web server, the server can specify
that a particular response is cacheable, and the web browser
can then store this response locally, either on disk or in mem-
ory. When the page is next requested, the web browser can
ask the server to send the response only if it has been mod-
ified since the last time it was accessed by the client. In
the case of a response cache hit, the server only returns a
short header instead of the complete remote resource, re-
sulting in a very short network traffic sequence. In some
cases, the client can even reuse the cached response without
querying the server for a remote copy, resulting in no net-
work traffic at all. Herrmann et al. [36] demonstrate a sig-
nificant decrease in the accuracy of web fingerprinting when
the browser uses the response cache. Indeed, deleting or dis-
abling the browser cache prior to fingerprinting attacks is a
common practice [66, 88].
We enable caching of page contents by the browser, and
measure the effect on fingerprinting accuracy. In the Firefox
browser we simply refrain from clearing the response cache
between sessions. For privacy reasons, the response cache
in the Tor Browser does not persist across session restarts.
Hence, when collecting data on the Tor Browser we “prime”
the cache before every recording by opening the web page in
another tab, allowing it to load for 15 seconds, then closing
the tab.
When we keep the browser’s response cache, the advan-
tage of cache-based website fingerprinting starts to emerge.
As Table 3 shows, the accuracy of the standard network-
based methods degrades when the response caching is en-
abled. We can see a degradation in accuracy of over 20% in
the fingerprinting accuracy.
In contrast, the cache-based methods are largely unaf-
fected by the reduction in network traffic, achieving high
accuracy rates. This result supports the conclusion that the
cache-based detection methods are not simply detecting the
CPU activity related to the handling of network traffic, mak-
ing them essentially a special case of network-based clas-
sifiers, but are rather detecting rendering activities of the
browser process.
7.4 Net-only and Render-only Results
Oren et al. [64] show that cache activity is correlated with
network activity, raising the possibility that cache-based fin-
gerprinting basically identifies the level of network activity.
To rule out this possibility and show that website rendering
also contributes to fingerprinting, we separate rendering (or
more precisely, data processing) activity from handling of
network data.
Render-Only Fingerprinting. To capture the data process-
ing activity, we neutralize the network activity by guarantee-
ing constant traffic levels. More specifically, we apply mold-
ing to the network traffic, ensuring that data flow between
the collection host and the network at a fixed bandwidth of
10 KB every 250 ms. To achieve that, we queue data trans-
mitted at a higher rate, or send dummy packets when the
transmitted data does not fill the desired bandwidth. These
dummy packets are silently dropped by the receiver. The
approach is, basically, BuFLO [22], with τ = ∞, i.e., when
the data stream continues indefinitely. This approach has a
high bandwidth overhead compared to WTF-PAD and WT,
however, it is designed to ensure that the network traffic is
constant irrespective of the contents of the website. As ex-
pected, the raw network captures in this scenario all have the
exact same size, which happens to be twice as large as the
largest network capture recorded without traffic molding.
Because all the traces are identical, the network-based
classifier assigns the same class to all of the traces, and its
accuracy is the same as a random guess. The results of cache-
based fingerprinting show a drop in accuracy compared with
unmolded traffic. However, the accuracy is still significantly
better than a random guess. This experiment demonstrates
the resilience of cache-based website fingerprinting to mit-
igation techniques aimed at network-based fingerprinting,
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and suggests that this privacy threat should be countered us-
ing a different class of mitigation techniques, as we explore
further in Section 9.
Network-Only Fingerprinting. In a complementing ex-
periment, we aim to capture only the network traffic. To
collect this dataset, we first capture actual traffic data from
a real browsing session. We then use a mock setup, that
does not involve a browser at all. Instead, we use two
tcpreplay [1] instances, one at the collection host, and
the other at a server, to emulate the network traffic, by re-
playing the data from the pcap file.
The results for this experiment show that the cache-based
classifier is capable of classifying many pages even when
no rendering activity is taking place. However, the accuracy
is significantly lower than in the case that rendering activity
does take place. In particular, our CNN classifier only detects
the correct website in about 20% of the cases, significantly
lower than the 73% we get for the matching closed-world
scenario. (But still much better than the 1% expected for a
random guess.) The accuracy of the network-based classifier
is the same as for the baseline, simply because the network
traffic is replicated.
Combining these two experiments we therefore conclude
that cache-based fingerprinting identifies features both in the
network traffic patterns and in the actual contents of the dis-
played web pages.
7.5 Dealing with Temporal Drift
The accuracy of network-based website fingerprinting
decays over time, when the contents of the website
changes [73]. Many websites use content management sys-
tems (CMS), in which the page layout is based on a fixed
template design, and only the resources loaded into this tem-
plate vary over time. Since, as we have shown, the cache-
based fingerprints capture rendering activities as well as net-
work activities, it would seem that the rendering-related
traces recorded by the cache-based method would have a
longer lifetime, and be more resistant to drift, than the
network-related traces captured by the traditional method.
To test this hypothesis, we repeat the data collection of
the baseline experiment after a delay of 36 days (start to
start). We then measure the ability of both cache-based
and network-based classifiers to accurately classify the new
traces, after being trained on the old traces. In this setting, we
see a drop of 5–10% in the accuracy of both classifiers. We
believe that further experiments are required for accurately
assessing how cache-based and network-based fingerprint-
ing handle temporal drifts.
8 Detecting Unknown Hardware Configura-
tions
In contrast to network-based fingerprinting, which is largely
target agnostic, cache-based fingerprinting needs to be tai-
lored to the precise hardware configuration of the victim ma-
chine, specifically the set count and associativity of its last-
level cache. Using a too large or a too small buffer reduces
the effectiveness of the technique, and eventually the accu-
racy of the classifier. There are, however, not that many pop-
ular configurations. For example, four cache configurations
(4096 or 8192 sets, 12 or 16 ways) cover most of the Intel
Core processor models.
If the target hardware configuration is known beforehand
(assuming, for example, that a particular user is singled out
for attack) the attacker can customize the parameters of the
JavaScript attack code to match the target PC’s parameters.
It would be interesting, however, to see how well an attacker
can remotely determine an unknown target’s cache config-
uration using JavaScript. To investigate this, we created a
JavaScript program that allocates a 20MB array in mem-
ory and iterates over it in several patterns which should fit
in well into different configurations of cache set-counts and
associativities. We then recorded the minimum, maximum
and mean access time per element, plus the standard devi-
ation, for each of these configurations. We collected 1,350
such measurements from multiple systems with cache sizes
of 3 MB, 4 MB, 6 MB, and 8 MB. We then used MATLAB’s
classification learner tool to apply a variety of machine learn-
ing classifiers to the measured data. Using both KNN and
SVM classifiers, we were able to correctly classify the con-
figuration of the target’s last-level cache with over 99.8%
classification accuracy under 5-fold cross validation. Inter-
estingly, even a simple tree-based classifier which compared
the minimum iteration time of three different configurations
to a predefined threshold was 99.6% accurate. We ported this
simple tree-based classifier to JavaScript, creating an LLC
cache size detector which we tested and found capable of ac-
curately detecting the cache sizes of 15 different machines
with diverse browser, hardware and operating system con-
figurations, taking less than 300 ms to run in all cases. Thus
generic attacks that adapt to the specific hardware configura-
tion seem feasible.
9 Countermeasures
We now discuss potential countermeasures to our finger-
printing attack. We first describe a cache masking technique
we experimented with. We then follow with a review of other
cache attack countermeasures suggested in the literature.
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Figure 6: Performance slowdown of our countermeasure on the SPEC benchmark. Error bars indicate one standard deviation.
INT and FP show the geometric mean of the SPEC integer and floating point benchmarks, respectively.
9.1 Cache Activity Masking
One well-studied mitigation method from the domain of
network-based cache fingerprinting involves creating spuri-
ous network activity to mask the actual website traffic [22].
It is possible to adapt such a masking technique to our do-
main and mask the actual website rendering activity by cre-
ating spurious activity in the cache. Our initial experiments
show that this is a promising mitigation, but further research
is needed to assess its effectiveness and its effect on perfor-
mance and on power consumption.
Masking implementation. Our countermeasure repeatedly
evicts the entire last-level. More specifically, we allocate a
cache-sized buffer and access every cache line in the buffer
in a loop. Such masking could be applied in the browser,
in the operating system, as a browser plugin, and even in-
corporated into a security-conscious website in the form of
JavaScript delivered to the client. For our initial proof of
concept implementation we chose to implement the counter-
measure as a standalone native code application, based on
a modification of the Mastik side-channel toolkit [95]. This
setting allows us to investigate the effectiveness of our coun-
termeasure while leaving deployment complexities for future
work.
Evaluation. We evaluated this countermeasure on a desk-
top computer featuring an Intel Core i5-2500, running Cen-
tos Linux version 7.6.1810. We enabled the countermea-
sure, then collected website traces both for Firefox (Linux)
and for the Tor Browser, using the same mix of traces de-
scribed in Section 4.2—10,000 traces for the closed-world
scenario, consisting of 100 traces for each of the Alexa top
100 websites, and 5,000 additional traces for the open-world
scenario, each collected for a single unique website. We split
the data set into training, testing and validation sets and ap-
plied 10-fold cross validation, as described in more detail in
Section 5.2.
Our experiments show that the countermeasure com-
pletely thwarts the attack when training is done on an unpro-
tected system—the accuracy of our classifier was at or below
the base rate of 1% for the closed-world scenario and 33%
for the open-world scenario. We also evaluated a scenario
in which the adversary is allowed to train on traces with the
countermeasure applied. In this more challenging scenario,
the countermeasure completely thwarts the attack when the
attack code is running from the Tor Browser. On Firefox,
however, we only noticed a moderate reduction in the effec-
tiveness of the attack. In the closed world scenario, the attack
achieves 73% success and in the open world the success rate
is 77%. (Down from 79% and 86%, respectively.)
Performance Impact. To understand the effect that
our countermeasure has system performance, we used the
industry-standard SPEC CPU benchmark [79], the de-facto
standard benchmark for measuring the performance of the
CPU and the memory subsystems. Figure 6 shows the re-
sults of the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks with our counter-
measure, relative to no countermeasure. The countermeasure
causes a slowdown of around 5% (geometric mean across
the benchmarks) with a worst case slowdown of 14% for the
bwaves benchmark. These results are from the average of
ten executions of the benchmarks for each case. With Tor
network performance being as it is, we believe that the per-
formance hit on CPU benchmarks is acceptable for this sce-
nario.
9.2 Other Countermeasures
Most of the past research into cache attacks has been done
in the context of side-channel cryptanalysis. Due to the dif-
ferent scenario, many of the countermeasures typically sug-
gested for cache-based attack are no longer effective. Tech-
niques such as constant-time programming [5] are only ap-
plicable to regular code, typically found in implementations
of cryptographic primitives. It is hard to see how such
techniques can be applied to web browsers. Similarly, as
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this work demonstrates, timer-based defenses that reduce the
timer frequency or add jitter are not effective.
Cache randomization techniques [58, 70, 91] dissociate
victim and adversary cache sets, and prevent the adversary
from monitoring victim access to specific addresses. How-
ever, our attack measures the overall cache activity rather
than looking at specific victim accesses. As such, such tech-
niques are unlikely to be effective against our attack.
Cache partitioning, either using dedicated hardware [21,
91] or via page coloring [55], is a promising approach for
mitigating cache attacks. In a nutshell, the approach parti-
tions the cache between security domains, preventing cross-
domain contention. Web pages are often rendered within
the same browser process. A page-coloring countermeasure
will, therefore, need to adapt to the browser scenario. Alter-
natively, the current shift to strict site isolation [81] as part of
the mitigations for Spectre [48], may assist in applying page
coloring to protect against our attack. A further limitation of
page coloring is that caches support only a handful of colors.
Hence, colors need to be shared, particularly when a large
number of tabs are open. To provide protection, page color-
ing will have to be augmented with a solution that prevents
concurrent use of the same color by multiple sites.
CACHEBAR [97] limits the contention caused by each pro-
cess as a protection for the Prime+Probe attack. Like cache
partitioning, this approach works at a process resolution and
may require adaptions to work in the web browser scenario.
Furthermore, unlike past cryptographic attacks that aim to
identify specific memory accesses, our technique measures
the overall memory use of the victim. Consequently, unless
CACHEBAR is configured to partition the cache, some cross-
process contention will remain, allowing our attack to work.
10 Limitations and Future Work
While the work demonstrates the feasibility of cache-based
website fingerprinting and provides an analysis of the attack,
it does leave some areas for further study. Being the first
analysis of its kind, the scope of the work does not match
the scope of similar works on network-based website finger-
printing. In particular, our datasets are significantly smaller
than those of Rimmer et al. [73], for example. Providing
larger datasets would allow better analysis of the effective-
ness of the technique and would be a beneficial service for
the research community as a whole.
In this work we collected the memorygrams on the same
hardware configuration used by the victim PC. While we
show that we can adapt the data collection to the specific
victim hardware (Section 8), at this stage it is not clear how
much a classifier trained on data collected with one hard-
ware configuration would be effective for classifying memo-
rygrams collected on a different configuration.
In the network-based website fingerprinting scenario, lit-
tle to no traffic travels through the network unless the user
is actively fetching a webpage. In the cache-based scenario,
however, the cache is always active to a degree, even before
the browser starts to receive and render the webpage. Rec-
ognizing the start of a trace may therefore be more difficult
in the cache-based setting than in the network-based setting,
especially in the case of a real attack. Our framework im-
plicitly synchronizes the trace with the start of the down-
load. Due to varying network conditions, we see differences
of up to six seconds between trace start and render start. As
such, we believe that our technique can identify web sites
even without the synchronization. Further experimentation
is required, however, to verify this fact. We also note that if
the machine is otherwise idle, cache activity can serve as a
(slightly noisy) indicator of the start of the trace.
The work further shares many of the limitations of
network-based fingerprinting [46]. In particular, websites
tend to change over time or based on the identity of the
user or the specifications of the computer used for displaying
them. Furthermore, our work, like most previous works, as-
sumes that only one website is displayed at each time. Both
Rimmer et al. [73] and our work briefly discuss temporal as-
pects of website fingerprinting, and we also looked a bit into
the issue (Section 7.5). However, further work is required to
assess the impact of this and other variables on the efficacy
of cache-based fingerprinting.
11 Conclusions
In this work we investigate the use of cache side channels
for website fingerprinting. We implement two memorygram-
mers, which capture the cache activity of the browser, and
show how to use deep learning to identify websites based on
the cache activity that displaying them induces.
We show that cache-based website fingerprinting achieves
results comparable with the state-of-the-art network-based
fingerprinting. We further show that cache-based fingerprint-
ing outperforms network-based fingerprinting under a com-
mon operating scenario, where the browser maintains cached
objects. Finally, we demonstrate that cache-based finger-
printing is resilient to both traffic molding and to reduced
timer resolution. The former being the standard defense for
network-based website fingerprinting and the latter the cur-
rently implemented countermeasure for mobile-code-based
microarchitectural attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first cache-based side channel attack that works
with the 100 ms clock rate of the Tor Browser.
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A Selected Hyperparameters
Tables 4, 5, and 6 summarize the hyperparameters for the
classifiers used in this work.
Table 4: Hyperparameters for the CNN classifier
Hyperparameter Value Space
Optimizer Adam Adamax, Adam, SGD, RMSprop
Learning rate 0.001 0.001–0.002
Batch size 100 40–100
Training epoch 20–30 Early stop by accuracy
Convolution layers 3 3–4
Input units (FF) 15000 15000–25000
Input units (Tor) 25000 15000–25000
CNN activation relu relu, tanh
Kernels 256 2–512
Kernel size 16,8,4 2–31
Pool size 4 2–8
Table 5: Hyperparameters for the LSTM classifier
Hyperparameter Value Space
Optimizer Adam Adamax, Adam, SGD, RMSprop
Learning rate 0.001 0.001–0.002
Batch size 100 40–100
Training epoch 20–30 Early stop by accuracy
Convolution layers 2 1–3
Input units (FF) 15000 15000–25000
Input units (Tor) 25000 15000–25000
CNN activation relu relu, tanh
LSTM activation tanh relu,tanh
Kernels 256 2–512
Kernel size 16,8 2–32
Pool size 4 2–8
Dropout 0.2 0.1–0.2
LSTM units 32 8,32
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Table 6: Hyperparameters for the LSTM classifier for the Tor
attack
Hyperparameter Value Space
Optimizer Adam Adamax, Adam, SGD, RMSprop
Learning rate 0.001 0.001–0.002
Batch size 100 40–100
Training epoch 20–30 Early stop by accuracy
Convolution layers 1 1–3
Input units 500 500
CNN activation relu relu, tanh
LSTM activation tanh relu,tanh
Kernels 256 2–512
Kernel size 32 2–32
Pool size 3 2–8
Dropout 0.4 0.1–0.4
LSTM units 128 8,32,128
B Websites Included in Closed-World
Datasets
9gag.com abs-cbn.com
adf.ly adobe.com
aliexpress.com allegro.pl
amazon.com amazonaws.com
aol.com apple.com
archive.org askcom.me
battle.net blastingnews.com
booking.com breitbart.com
bukalapak.com businessinsider.com
conservativetribune.com dailymail.co.uk
dailymotion.com detik.com
deviantart.com dictionary.com
digikala.com doubleclick.net
doublepimp.com ebay.com
espncricinfo.com exoclick.com
extratorrent.cc facebook.com
feedly.com gamepedia.com
github.com go.com
godaddy.com goodreads.com
google.com hclips.com
hola.com hotmovs.com
imdb.com instructure.com
intuit.com kompas.com
leboncoin.fr liputan6.com
livejasmin.com livejournal.com
ltn.com.tw microsoftonline.com
mozilla.org msn.com
naver.com netflix.com
nicovideo.jp nih.gov
ntd.tv office.com
onedio.com openload.co
oracle.com ouo.io
outbrain.com pinterest.com
popads.net quora.com
researchgate.net roblox.com
rt.com rutracker.org
scribd.com skype.com
soundcloud.com sourceforge.net
spotify.com spotscenered.info
stackexchange.com stackoverflow.com
steamcommunity.com steampowered.com
t.co theguardian.com
thesaurus.com tistory.com
tokopedia.com torrentz2.eu
tribunnews.com tumblr.com
twitter.com weather.com
wikia.com wikipedia.org
wittyfeed.com xhamster.com
xvideos.com yandex.ru
yelp.com zippyshare.com
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